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Table 6 Main determinants of the training intensity for firms with collective agreements.

From: Another piece of the puzzle: Firms’ investment in training as production of optimal skills inventory

  OC UC DS Interaction CR DS
(1) %change (2) %change
Overage costs
 Total overage costs − 0.0654*** (0.017) − 6.33%   
Underage costs
 Total underage costs 0.0012* (0.001) 0.12%   
Demand structure
 Industry volatility 0.0306*** (0.011) 3.11% 0.0341*** (0.010) 3.47%
Interaction CR DS
 Critical ratio    0.0440 (0.029) 4.50%
 Critical ratio × volatility    − 0.0020 (0.001) − 0.20%
 Constant − 3.5745*** (0.547)   − 3.6351*** (0.539)  
 Controls    Included Included
Number of observations 1592 1592 1592 1592
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.070 0.065 0.065
  1. Table reports marginal effects of a negative binomial regression for firms with collective agreements; all costs are in 10,000 Euros per person; %-change calculated as (incidence-rate ratio− 1) × 100; dependent variable: Number of apprentices; controls: Firm’s size (in #employees), Firm’s age (in years), Collective agreements (binary), Worker representation (binary), Training occupation, and Federal state; standard errors in parentheses; * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level