Skip to main content

Table 6 Main determinants of the training intensity for firms with collective agreements.

From: Another piece of the puzzle: Firms’ investment in training as production of optimal skills inventory

 

OC UC DS

Interaction CR DS

(1)

%change

(2)

%change

Overage costs

 Total overage costs

− 0.0654*** (0.017)

− 6.33%

  

Underage costs

 Total underage costs

0.0012* (0.001)

0.12%

  

Demand structure

 Industry volatility

0.0306*** (0.011)

3.11%

0.0341*** (0.010)

3.47%

Interaction CR DS

 Critical ratio

  

0.0440 (0.029)

4.50%

 Critical ratio × volatility

  

− 0.0020 (0.001)

− 0.20%

 Constant

− 3.5745*** (0.547)

 

− 3.6351*** (0.539)

 

 Controls

  

Included

Included

Number of observations

1592

1592

1592

1592

Pseudo R2

0.070

0.070

0.065

0.065

  1. Table reports marginal effects of a negative binomial regression for firms with collective agreements; all costs are in 10,000 Euros per person; %-change calculated as (incidence-rate ratio− 1) × 100; dependent variable: Number of apprentices; controls: Firm’s size (in #employees), Firm’s age (in years), Collective agreements (binary), Worker representation (binary), Training occupation, and Federal state; standard errors in parentheses; * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level