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Table 2 OLS estimation of CTV spending

From: Does CVT of firms in Germany suffer from poaching?

Dep. variable: log(CVT exp. (€)/worker)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Turnover 1

−0.004

−0.003

−0.004

−0.001

−0.001

0.003

(In %)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.006)

Turnover 2

−0.007

−0.003

−0.003

−0.0003

−0.0003

−0.0003

(In %)

(0.020)

(0.014)

(0.015)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

Specifity of CVT

−0.008

−0.035

−0.057

−0.087

−0.118

−0.090

(0 = rather general, 1 = rather specific)

(0.166)

(0.154)

(0.146)

(0.134)

(0.162)

(0.134)

TO1 X CVT specificity

    

0.005

 

(Interaction term)

    

(0.015)

 

Collective labor agreement

  

−0.270*

−0.335**

−0.332**

−0.337**

(0 = no, 1 = yes)

  

(0.142)

(0.133)

(0.132)

(0.132)

Worker representation

  

0.251

0.109

0.106

0.109

(0 = no, 1 = yes)

  

(0.155)

(0.164)

(0.163)

(0.163)

Innovativeness

  

0.324***

0.266**

0.268**

0.267**

(0 = low, 1 = high)

  

(0.120)

(0.115)

(0.115)

(0.115)

R + D activities

  

0.074

0.045

0.044

0.039

(0 = no, 1 = yes)

  

(0.139)

(0.138)

(0.139)

(0.140)

Demands on workers

  

−0.136

−0.066

−0.065

−0.073

(−1 = increasing, 0 = stable, 1 = decreasing)

  

(0.158)

(0.153)

(0.154)

(0.153)

Qualification structure

  

−0.142

−0.098

−0.102

−0.100

(1 = employment of workers w/o degree, 0)

  

(0.138)

(0.126)

(0.124)

(0.125)

Wages

   

0.511***

0.510***

0.505***

(logged)

   

(0.148)

(0.148)

(0.148)

CVT professionalism

   

0.364***

0.365***

0.369***

(0 = low, 1 = high)

   

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.112)

Training funds receipts

   

0.298

0.292

0.304

(0 = no, 1 = yes)

   

(0.205)

(0.207)

(0.206)

Payback clauses

   

0.448***

0.448***

0.518***

(0 = no, 1 = yes)

   

(0.123)

(0.123)

(0.144)

TO1 X payback clauses

     

−0.011

(Interaction term)

     

(0.011)

CVT agreements

   

0.095

0.097

0.0946

(0 = no, 1 = yes)

   

(1.177)

(1.177)

(0.176)

Recognition of externalities

   

0.165

0.165

0.162

(Self-reported; 0 = no, 1 = yes)

   

(0.174)

(0.174)

(0.146)

Sensitivity to risk of turnover

   

0.006

0.010

0.009

(Self-reported; 0 = no, 1 = yes)

   

(0.147)

(0.148)

(0.146)

Industrial agglomeration

 

−0.071

−0.064

0.003

0.002

0.001

(0 = no, 1 = yes)

 

(0.126)

(0.129)

(0.129)

(0.129)

(0.129)

Metropolitan distance

 

−0.116

0.114

−0.125

−0.124

−0.122

(0 = up to 50 km, 1 = more than 50 km)

 

(0.132)

(0.133)

(0.129)

(0.131)

(0.131)

Firm size (ref. 5–9 Besch.)

      

10-49 employees

 

−0.318**

−0.371***

−0.442***

−0.440***

−0.440***

  

(0.134)

(0.135)

(0.132)

(0.133)

(0.132)

50-249 employees

 

−0.643***

−0.714***

−1.014***

−1.009***

−1.002***

  

(0.145)

(0.170)

(0.176)

(0.175)

(0.176)

250 or more employees

 

−0.539***

−0.675***

−1.081***

−1.081***

−1.078***

  

(0.159)

(0.209)

(0.219)

(0.219)

(0.218)

Industry controls

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Region controls

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Constant

5.354***

5.669***

5.810***

0.593

0.612

0.588

 

(0.085)

(0.787)

(0.794)

(1.633)

(1.626)

(1.629)

N

974

974

972

962

962

962

Pseudo-R2

0.004

0.166

0.201

0.289

0.290

0.291

  1. Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Multiply imputed data. Reported R2 relates to the respective estimates based on a single imputation approach. Column 5 considers an interaction term between turnover rate 1 and training specificity. Column 6 considers an interaction term between turnover rate 1 and the existence of payback clauses.